Fake job interview malware aimed at developers: the take-home test that steals your keys
Fake job interview malware reaches a developer through a take-home task: a recruiter sends a repository, tells you to clone and run it, and if you open it in VS Code and trust the author, VS Code runs the task file that fetches the backdoor. Read the repository before you run anything, and open code from a stranger only in a non-persistent virtual machine. If you already ran it, clean the Mac before you change any tokens.
The message looks ordinary: a recruiter, a short coding task, a repository link. The danger sits in the folder, not in the task. This page explains how fake job interview malware works, the signs that give it away, and what to do if you already ran the project. How to read any repository before you open it is on GitHub malware repository.
01How fake job interview malware reaches you
The operation is called Contagious Interview, and it has been active since at least December 2022. The recruiters pose as people from crypto trading or AI firms and tell the candidate to clone and run an npm package hosted on GitHub, GitLab or Bitbucket. npm is the package manager for JavaScript.
The pitch is small on purpose. One reported message reads: "Would you mind completing a small coding assessment?" followed by "Just clone this repo and fix a few bugs. Should only take 30 minutes.". A busy developer clones the repo and opens it in an editor without reading it, and that is the moment the attacker is waiting for.
02What happens when you open the folder
VS Code has a feature called tasks: commands defined in a file named tasks.json inside a .vscode folder. A task set to runOn folderOpen runs when the containing folder is opened, and VS Code then executes the specified command automatically. If trust is granted, VS Code runs the repository's task configuration file, which fetches and loads the backdoor. A backdoor is a program that gives the attacker remote access to your Mac. One of them, Invisible Ferret, is a Python backdoor used in later stages.
This is not a one-off. Within about a month, by March 2026, attackers planted malicious .vscode/tasks.json files in 400+ GitHub repositories across dozens of organizations. The .vscode directory is routinely ignored in security reviews, so a repository that looks normal and popular can still carry the file.
When VS Code asks if you trust the authors of a folder, that question is the whole defense at this point: new unfamiliar folders open in Restricted Mode, which limits tasks, the terminal, extensions and AI agents, and automatic tasks never run in an untrusted workspace. The scam depends on the candidate clicking "trust" to get on with the task, because the trust dialog is the last thing between the folder and the command.
03What the malware takes
On macOS the backdoor searches the entire filesystem for credential and secret files. The operation harvests API tokens, cloud credentials, signing keys, crypto wallets and password manager artifacts. Developers keep exactly these on their Macs, which is why this lure targets them. A signing key lets someone publish software as you, a cloud credential opens your servers, and a wallet holds money. None of that is limited to the one project the recruiter sent you. The backdoor looks at the whole disk, so the other repositories, the shell history and the files in your home folder are all in reach.
04Signs of fake job interview malware
| Sign | What it looks like | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| A quick task from a recruiter | Clone this repo and fix a few bugs, 30 minutes | The pitch is built to make you skip the reading |
| An employer in crypto or AI | Recruiters from crypto trading or AI firms | These are the firms the lure pretends to be |
| The repo is an npm package | You are told to clone and run it | Packages and tasks run code on your Mac |
| A .vscode/tasks.json file | A task with runOn folderOpen | It runs on opening, before you read any code |
| Review is skipped | The recruiter wants it run now | Review of a recruiter's repository before running scripts, installing dependencies or executing tasks is the recommended policy |
None of these proves malice alone, and a real company can send a repo too. The point is to look at the folder before the folder runs anything. If two or three signs are present at once, treat the task as hostile and handle it the way the next section describes.
05What to do with the repo before you open it
The safest answer to an unexpected repository from a recruiter is to treat it like any stranger's code: it is not yours, you have not read it, and opening it in your normal editor on your normal Mac is the risky part.
If the task is real and you still want to do it, run it only in a throwaway environment: a non-persistent virtual machine, meaning a computer simulated inside your Mac that you can delete afterwards, with nothing of yours in it. Review the repository first, before scripts, installs or tasks. Read the file list from a terminal and not from an editor that may run it; the exact files and commands are on GitHub malware repository.
If you open the repo with an AI agent, the same rule holds: look first, and run the agent on it only inside the throwaway environment. The advisories that affected Claude Code are listed on Claude Code security.
06If you already ran the test project
Assume the keys on that Mac are exposed, since the backdoor goes looking for them. The order matters: clean the Mac first and change passwords only after that, from another device. Do these in order.
- Clean the Mac. Login items are programs that start when you log in, and LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons are files that tell macOS to start a program in the background. Remove the ones you do not recognize, and consider a full clean reinstall of macOS. Do not restore a backup or Time Machine image that may carry the infection. How to check for an infostealer has the details.
- Change passwords from another device. After cleanup, change all passwords that were stored on the Mac and enable MFA. Do it from a phone or laptop you trust that never touched the repository.
- Revoke GitHub tokens and SSH keys. Before you do, read the first step on GitHub account hacked, because a background process on an infected Mac can react to a revoked token. On a personal account you delete tokens and SSH keys one by one in GitHub settings; the one-step "revoke all credentials" option is only for some enterprise accounts.
- Replace long-lived tokens. Prefer short-lived credentials and vaults over long-lived tokens in environment files. Other keys are on leaked API keys.
- Check what else was in reach. Wallets are on crypto wallet drained, and browser sessions on cookie hijacking.
Extensions are a separate way in, covered on malicious VS Code extensions.
07Fake job interview malware: what to remember
The lure is a small task from a recruiter, and the payload is a task file that runs when the folder opens. Read the repo before you open it, keep unfamiliar folders in Restricted Mode, and run the test in a non-persistent VM. If you already ran it, the order is clean the Mac, change passwords from another device, then revoke tokens.
A take-home task that runs code leaves a trace in what started on the Mac; Artificial Immunity's free, open-source core watches program starts and reports what it finds.
FAQ
What is Contagious Interview?
It is the name of a social engineering operation, active since at least December 2022, that targets developers with fake job interviews.
How does a fake job interview install malware?
A fake recruiter tells you to clone and run an npm package from GitHub, GitLab or Bitbucket. If you open it in VS Code and trust the author, VS Code runs the repository's task file, which fetches the backdoor.
What does the malware take?
API tokens, cloud credentials, signing keys, crypto wallets and password manager artifacts. On macOS the backdoor searches the whole filesystem for credential and secret files.
Can opening a repository alone infect my Mac?
Yes, in VS Code, if the folder is trusted: a task set to run on folder open is executed automatically, so simply opening a cloned repository in the editor can compromise the system. Automatic tasks never run in an untrusted workspace.
How do I test a take-home project safely?
Use a dedicated, isolated environment such as a non-persistent virtual machine, and review the repository before running scripts or installing dependencies. The reading steps are on the GitHub repository page.
What if I already ran the test project?
Treat the Mac as exposed. Clean it, then change the passwords and tokens that were stored on it, from another device you trust. The steps are below.
Related guides
Sources
- Microsoft Security Blog, Contagious Interview
- OpenSourceMalware, TasksJacker and the Fake Font variant
- VS Code docs, Workspace Trust
- VS Code docs, tasks
- VS Code docs, Dev Containers
- Cursor docs, agent security
- Claude Code docs, hooks
- Claude Code docs, MCP
- Claude Code docs, permission modes
- Claude Code security advisories
- Malwarebytes, AMOS cleanup guidance
- Artificial Immunity
- Cursor security notice, rotate from a trusted system
- GitHub docs, managing personal access tokens
- GitHub docs, reviewing your SSH keys
- GitHub docs, revoking your credentials