Malicious VSCode extensions in VS Code, Open VSX and Cursor: cases and how to check yours
A malicious VSCode extension is an add-on that runs code on your Mac with the same reach as your editor. Cases include the official Amazon Q extension in July 2025, a fake Solidity extension in Cursor and a tampered copy of the Claude Code extension in Cursor's marketplace that tried to install a persistent SSH backdoor. Workspace Trust does not stop a malicious extension. To check yours, open the extensions list in your editor and remove what you do not use, then look at Login Items & Extensions in System Settings for anything that starts on its own. If you already installed a bad one, removing it is not enough; see the last section.
An add-on is not a theme with a few settings. It is code that your editor loads and runs. That is what makes a bad one dangerous, and it is also why the cases below follow a pattern: a trusted name, a quiet update or a fake lookalike, and a payload that runs at once.
01What a malicious VSCode extension can do
An extension runs as a program on your machine: it can do anything VS Code itself can do, including reading and writing your files. Workspace Trust, the VS Code feature that asks if you trust a folder, cannot prevent a malicious extension from executing code and ignoring Restricted Mode. The fake Solidity one in Cursor showed the shape of it: it implemented none of its claimed features and only downloaded and executed malicious code.
Extensions also update on their own. VS Code extensions update automatically by default, so users received malicious versions without doing anything. A trusted add-on can turn bad after you installed it, if its publisher is compromised. Amazon Q is the example: an official extension from a large vendor carried the bad code for two days.
02Dated cases
| When | Extension or registry | What happened |
|---|---|---|
| July 2025 | Amazon Q Developer for VS Code, version 1.84.0 | A token with too wide a scope let an attacker commit malicious code that shipped in a release (CVE-2025-8217) |
| June 2025 | Fake Solidity extension for Cursor, from Open VSX | It only downloaded and ran malicious code |
| October 2025 | Open VSX registry | Leaked publishing tokens were used to publish malicious extensions |
| October 2025 | GlassWorm | Code hidden in invisible Unicode characters, command and control through the Solana blockchain |
| October 2026 | A tampered copy of the Claude Code extension in Cursor's marketplace | It tried to install a persistent SSH backdoor |
03Amazon Q, July 2025
On 23 July 2025, AWS reported that an inappropriately scoped GitHub token let a threat actor commit malicious code into the extension's open-source repository, and the code was automatically included in a release. The compromised extension carried a prompt to wipe the user's home directory and delete AWS resources, and it was live on the VS Code marketplace for two days. The script passed that prompt to the Amazon Q command-line tool with the arguments --trust-all-tools and --no-interactive, which in plain words means a prompt to act without stopping to ask. AWS says the code was distributed with the add-on but did not run because of a syntax error.
CVE-2025-8217 is the public ID number for this flaw; you can use it to look the case up. If you had version 1.84.0, update to 1.85.0, because the code stays in an installed 1.84.0.
04The fake Solidity extension in Cursor
A blockchain developer had about $500,000 in crypto stolen after installing a fake Solidity extension in Cursor. The extension came from the Open VSX registry, the public extension store that Cursor uses. In search results for "solidity" it appeared fourth, while the legitimate one was only eighth. A search rank is not a sign of trust. The aftermath for the wallet is on crypto wallet drained.
05Open VSX and GlassWorm
Open VSX is an open registry of editor extensions, and Cursor installs from it. Two things happened there in October 2025.
The Eclipse Foundation, which runs Open VSX, says the leaked publishing tokens were developer mistakes, not a compromise of the Open VSX infrastructure, and that all affected tokens were revoked. A separate report described a malware campaign that used some of those leaked tokens to publish malicious extensions. The Open VSX team considered the incident fully contained and closed on 21 October 2025, and added shorter token lifetimes and automated scanning at publication, which looks for malicious code patterns or embedded secrets before an add-on becomes available.
GlassWorm is the name of the campaign. It hid code in invisible Unicode characters, so the bad lines are not visible when you read the source, and it used the Solana blockchain as its command and control, the channel the malware takes orders from. After infecting a system it harvests npm tokens, GitHub credentials and OpenVSX access tokens. Its numbers are contested. Koi Security, which found it, and Veracode called it the first self-propagating worm on these marketplaces, with at least 35,800 compromised installations. The Eclipse Foundation believes the count overstates the number of affected users because bots inflated the downloads, and says the malware did not spread on its own through systems or user machines.
06The tampered Cursor extension
On 29 October 2026, for about eleven hours, malicious versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 of the Claude Code extension, not built by Anthropic, were available in Cursor's extension marketplace for macOS and Windows. The extension ran malicious code that attempts to install a persistent SSH backdoor. On macOS it tries to make a reverse SSH tunnel persistent through a LaunchAgent, and background scripts retry the tunnel roughly every 60 seconds. A LaunchAgent is a small config file that makes macOS start a program at login. That is why the last section starts with the LaunchAgent and not with the uninstall: removing the add-on alone does not remove the tunnel.
To check if you had one of those versions, open the Extensions view (⇧⌘X in the editor), find the Claude Code extension and read its version number. If it was 2.1.312 or 2.1.313, follow the last section.
07How to check your extensions
The check has two halves: what the editor has installed, and what the Mac has been told to start on its own. A bad add-on that set up persistence can outlive the add-on itself, so do both.
- List what you have installed and remove what you do not use. In VS Code, open the Extensions view with ⇧⌘X, or run
code --list-extensionsin Terminal to print the installed list. - Do not read popularity as trust. The fake Solidity add-on outranked the real one in search.
- Check the Mac for items that start on their own. Open Login Items & Extensions settings, which lists the items that open automatically whenever you log in. Also look for LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons you do not recognize.
- Know your registry. Cursor uses Open VSX, so the Open VSX incident applies to Cursor users, not only to VS Code.
- Do not rely on the trust prompt. Workspace Trust cannot prevent a malicious extension from executing code, and in Cursor workspace trust is off by default.
Repositories are another way in that needs no extension; see how to check a GitHub repo and fake job interview malware. The npm side of GlassWorm is on npm malware.
08If you installed a bad one
Uninstalling the add-on may not be sufficient, because the persistence it set up on the Mac stays. Do these in order.
- Remove the LaunchAgent the add-on created. Look in ~/Library/LaunchAgents and /Library/LaunchAgents and in /Library/LaunchDaemons for files you did not create, and remove any login item you do not recognize. Cursor's advice is to also remove the unauthorized SSH key and any running tunnel processes, and to assess whether the machine should be rebuilt. If you cannot do this yourself, treat the Mac as compromised and do a full clean reinstall of macOS.
- Change credentials and sessions that were reachable from that Mac, from a trusted device. After cleanup, change the passwords stored on the machine.
- Revoke GitHub and registry tokens, since GlassWorm harvested npm, GitHub and OpenVSX tokens. Read the first step on GitHub account hacked before you revoke.
09Malicious VSCode extension: what to remember
A malicious VSCode extension runs as code on your Mac, updates itself by default and is not stopped by Workspace Trust. After a bad install, check for a LaunchAgent and change credentials from a trusted device.
An extension runs as a program under your editor; Artificial Immunity's free, open-source core watches program starts and reports what it finds.
FAQ
What are malicious extensions?
Extensions that do something other than what they claim. A fake Solidity extension for Cursor implemented none of its claimed features and only downloaded and ran malicious code.
Are all extensions on VS Code safe?
No. The official Amazon Q extension for VS Code was compromised and was live on the marketplace for two days. The affected version was 1.84.0.
How to know if a VS Code extension is safe?
Do not trust search rank: the fake Solidity extension ranked fourth in search for "solidity" while the legitimate one ranked eighth. Check what the extension does and who publishes it before you install.
Can you give me a list of malicious VSCode extensions?
The table on this page lists the dated cases. It is not a complete list, so check each extension you have with the steps on this page.
Does Workspace Trust protect against a malicious extension?
No. Workspace Trust cannot prevent a malicious extension from executing code and ignoring Restricted Mode.
Do extensions update on their own?
By default, yes. VS Code extensions update automatically by default, so users received malicious GlassWorm versions without any action.
What if I installed a malicious extension?
Uninstalling the extension may not be sufficient. Look for a LaunchAgent, then change credentials and sessions that were reachable from that Mac, from a trusted device.
Related guides
Sources
- Kaspersky Securelist, fake Solidity extension for Cursor
- Eclipse Foundation, Open VSX security update October 2025
- Veracode, GlassWorm
- AWS security bulletin AWS-2025-015
- The Register, Amazon Q extension
- Cursor, extension security notice
- VS Code docs, Workspace Trust
- Cursor docs, agent security
- VS Code docs, extension marketplace
- Apple Support, login items and extensions
- Malwarebytes, AMOS cleanup guidance
- Artificial Immunity
- VS Code docs, extension runtime security
- VS Code docs, command line interface
- VS Code docs, extension marketplace