Atomic Stealer (AMOS) on Mac: how it spreads and how to check
Atomic Stealer on Mac, also called AMOS, is a stealer that its developers sell as malware as a service, meaning they rent it to other criminals. It reaches a Mac because the user starts it: a fake installer, a command pasted into Terminal or a fake password prompt. It goes for the Keychain, browser sessions, wallets and documents. If you ran something doubtful, replace your passwords, keys and sessions from a clean computer.
You may be reading about Atomic Stealer on Mac because a news item named AMOS or because you pasted a command and now doubt it. A report about a family does not mean your Mac has it. What the reports give you is a list of ways it arrives, and some of those lures are recognizable before you paste or mount anything. The malware is in active development, so the details change over time. The steps at the end do not.
01What AMOS is
AMOS stands for Atomic macOS Stealer. It is sold to other criminals, who then run their own campaigns. It is related to other names: Poseidon is described as a fork or direct competitor, and MacSync first emerged in 2024 to 2025 as a variant of AMOS. In 2025 AMOS also added a backdoor component, a hidden way for the operators to get back into a compromised Mac. An early report described the rental package as including a web panel for the criminals to manage victims, brute-forcing of MetaMask wallet seed phrases and a crypto checker. The full list of Mac families is on the Mac infostealers page.
02How Atomic Stealer on Mac spreads
In every route below you are the last step: you mount the file or paste the command. A DMG is a disk image, the usual way to install a Mac app.
| Route | What happens |
|---|---|
| Malicious ads | The usual way operators spread AMOS. An earlier campaign used sponsored ads and fake GitHub pages that impersonated macOS software. |
| Poisoned AI chats | A search for "clear disk space on macOS" led to shared ChatGPT and Grok chats that ended in a Terminal command. Attackers pay for a sponsored result or use SEO to push such a chat to the top. |
| Fake installers | A fake AlliAi.dmg reached through redirects. Early versions came as a Setup.dmg with a fake password prompt. |
| Cracked software and fake tools | Cracked-software sites, and a fake "macOS toolkit" page that told users to paste a command into Terminal. |
| Agent skills | A skill is a file of instructions an AI agent reads. Malicious instructions in a SKILL.md file make the agent show fake setup requirements, and a fake password dialog then asks for your password. AMOS moved from cracked software to this route. See indirect prompt injection for the general idea of instructions hidden in content an agent reads. |
03The paste-in-Terminal trick
ClickFix is a trick where a web page, forum post or chat tells you to copy a command and paste it into Terminal. The pasted command downloads a script, and that script can run without a security warning. On the Mac it looks like a harmless fix for a disk-space or app problem.
Apple added a check for this. macOS 26.4 scans commands pasted into Terminal before they run. You may see "Possible malware, Paste blocked", and the check helps only if you do not click "Paste Anyway" too quickly. Do not run commands copied from random pages or forums, including ones that download a script and run it in one step. For macOS troubleshooting, rely on Apple's own documentation, and avoid unsigned DMGs and unofficial "terminal fix" tools.
04The Script Editor version
One ClickFix attack skips Terminal. A web page opens Script Editor, the Mac app for writing and running scripts, through a special link type, and the lure is an Apple-themed page offering to "reclaim disk space on your Mac". The script then downloads a program that is a recent Atomic Stealer variant and runs it. On recent macOS Tahoe versions Script Editor shows an extra prompt before the script is saved and run. Treat Script Editor prompts as high-risk unless you understand what they do and trust where they came from.
05How fast it works
In one AMOS campaign in January 2026, the attackers had a lasting remote link to the Mac within minutes of the first user click. The fake AlliAi.dmg in that campaign was hosted on newly registered infrastructure. That is the reason the advice on this page does not wait for proof. If you mounted a file or pasted a command you now doubt, treat the Mac as exposed for the accounts it could reach, and start replacing secrets the same day.
06What Atomic Stealer on Mac takes
| Data | Notes |
|---|---|
| Keychains, browser credentials and sessions from Chrome, Edge, Safari and Firefox, Apple Notes, desktop and document files | The macOS Keychain is the built-in store for saved passwords |
| Browser wallets, autofill data, passwords, cookies, stored cards | Commodity malware sold as a service |
| The macOS account password, through a fake prompt | Early versions |
Apple and KeePass keychains and documents, but not .env files | One variant |
The cookies and tokens in that list are explained on session hijacking. For wallets, see crypto wallet drained.
07Signs and traces to check
Domains, file names and other published indicators change often, so these are places and behaviors rather than names:
- A password prompt during an install. AMOS asked for the account password before the infection went on, and Terminal then asked for more permissions.
- A dot-folder under Application Support. A folder whose name starts with a dot is hidden in Finder. AMOS hid copies in folders such as
.com.apple.accountsd. - A root LaunchDaemon. This is a background job that macOS runs for the whole system. In one campaign it was a program that waited for commands from the attacker.
- A login item or LaunchAgent you did not add. The two places to look are in the infostealer check.
None of these is proof on its own, and finding one does not tell you what was taken. So the steps below replace secrets instead of waiting for a verdict. AMOS may also leave no traces at all: one variant has no persistence, and stolen sessions work without it.
08If you ran something
Do not panic, and do not paste a "fix" from a search result: that is how AMOS was delivered in the AI chat campaign. Replace the passwords, keys and sessions the Mac could reach, working from a trusted computer. Start with email, cloud and code accounts. Then change the passwords that were stored on the Mac and turn on two-step sign-in, where a second proof such as a code is needed. If signs of persistence remain, consider a clean reinstall of macOS and do not restore a backup that may be tainted.
The same list with more detail is on the infostealer check page.
09Related pages
The background is on what an infostealer is. If you install agent skills from public lists, open the SKILL.md file and read it first: the agent follows the instructions inside it. Atomic Stealer on Mac is only one family, and developers have one more to know, XCSSET, which hides in Xcode projects. A fake recruiter who asks you to run a project is another developer route, covered in fake job interview malware.
Atomic Stealer sets up a background item to stay on the Mac; Artificial Immunity's free, open-source core watches program starts and reports what it finds.
FAQ
What is Atomic Stealer?
Atomic Stealer, also called AMOS, is a Mac infostealer that its developers sell as malware as a service on forums and Telegram.
How does Atomic Stealer get on a Mac?
Through the user. It has been spread through ClickFix campaigns, malicious ads and cracked-software sites, and through a fake AlliAi.dmg reached by redirects.
What does the AMOS stealer take?
Keychains, browser credentials and sessions from Chrome, Edge, Safari and Firefox, Apple Notes and documents, plus browser wallets, autofill, cookies and cards.
Does Atomic Stealer stay on the Mac?
Sometimes. One campaign used a root LaunchDaemon, and one variant has no persistence. Either way, stolen sessions work without it.
Can macOS block the paste-in-Terminal trick?
In part. macOS 26.4 scans commands pasted into Terminal before they run, and it can show a Paste blocked warning. It helps only if you do not click Paste Anyway too quickly.
How do I check for Atomic Stealer?
Ask what you ran, then look for a login item you did not add, new files in the LaunchAgents folders and dot-folders under Application Support. Replace credentials from a trusted system whatever you find.
Related guides
Sources
- Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, macOS stealers
- Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, AMOS activity
- Microsoft Defender Experts, hunting infostealers on macOS
- Jamf Threat Labs, ClickFix and Script Editor
- BleepingComputer, Script Editor ClickFix campaign
- Malwarebytes, poisoned AI chats spread AMOS
- Malwarebytes, Terminal paste warning
- Trend Micro, malicious agent skills spread AMOS
- Artificial Immunity