XCSSET malware: infected Xcode projects explained
XCSSET malware is a modular macOS stealer that infects Xcode projects and runs while a project is built. It spreads because developers share project files. It takes files, wallet data and notes, and can persist through the .zshrc file or a fake Dock app. The habit that protects you: always inspect and verify an Xcode project you download or clone before you build it.
This page is for people who build Mac or iOS apps, and it covers XCSSET malware from the first infected project to cleanup. If you do not build apps, it is unlikely to reach you the way it reaches developers, and the pages on what an infostealer is and the Mac stealer table fit you better. Xcode is Apple's development tool, and a project is the folder of source files and settings you open and build in it.
01What XCSSET malware is
XCSSET is modular macOS malware: it is made of separate pieces, each with its own job. It has been operating in the wild since 2020, and nobody knows who is behind it. The March 2025 variant was the first known one since 2022.
| Report | What changed |
|---|---|
| March 2025 | Enhanced obfuscation (code made hard to read), updated persistence and new infection strategies |
| September 2025 | Browser targeting, clipboard hijacking and new persistence |
The September 2025 variant also targets Firefox. Findings were shared with Apple, and GitHub took down affected repositories.
02How an infected project reaches you
The usual picture of Xcode malware is a project file that carries more than it shows. XCSSET spreads because project files are shared among developers who build Apple or macOS apps. It travels through compromised GitHub repositories disguised as legitimate tools. So the usual route is not a stranger's installer. It is a project you cloned from a repository, or one a colleague passed on.
Stealers such as AMOS, MacSync and DigitStealer need you to mount a fake DMG or paste a command. This stealer rides your normal workflow instead: you clone a project, press build, and the malware runs as part of that build.
03Is opening a project enough?
XCSSET runs while a project is built. Opening a project to read its files is a different step from pressing build, and the build is the step to take care with. Inspect a project you did not write before the first build: the folder names, the scripts and anything that does not belong to a normal app project.
This is also why the other Mac stealers need a different kind of care. They rely on a fake DMG or a pasted command, which you can spot as a lure on a web page. XCSSET arrives inside a project you chose to open, so the weak point is how far you trust where it came from.
04What it does once the project builds
XCSSET steals files, system and user information, digital wallet data and notes. Three behaviors are worth knowing:
- Notes. It steals the contents of the Notes app through a fake Reminders app.
- Clipboard. A module swaps copied wallet addresses for the attacker's addresses. Always verify that pasted content matches the intended source. See crypto wallet drained for how that plays out.
- Updates. A September 2025 variant changes two settings to disable macOS automatic configuration updates and Rapid Security Response.
For app developers there is a further risk. XCSSET can change Xcode build settings and compromise final app binaries without disrupting development workflows. A project you suspect is worth reviewing before you ship a build from it.
05Where XCSSET malware hides on the machine
Persistence means the way malware survives a restart. Three places are reported:
.zshrc, the file your shell reads when Terminal opens, and a fake Launchpad in the Dock. Both belong to the March 2025 variant.- A LaunchDaemon, a background job macOS runs for the whole system, in the September 2025 variant.
- Pre-commit hooks in the
.gitdirectory of projects on the device. A pre-commit hook is a script Git runs before each commit.
06Before you build someone else's project
Xcode malware like this works only if you build the infected project, so a few habits help before that step:
- Know where the project came from, and prefer the original repository over a copy passed around. A repository that looks like a handy tool is how the malware is disguised.
- For code from a stranger, such as a take-home test, use a dedicated isolated environment like a virtual machine that is thrown away afterwards.
- After you build something you are unsure about, read your
.zshrcfile and the project's git hooks as plain text. - Do not paste a command from a page to "fix" a build error. That is the route other stealers use, and XCSSET does not need it, because it runs as part of the build.
07What developers should check
None of these checks proves a Mac is clean. They are the places where the reports put the malware.
| Place | What to look for |
|---|---|
Your .zshrc file | Lines you did not write |
| The Dock | A Launchpad icon that opens a copy stored in a cache folder instead of the real Launchpad |
| Login Items & Extensions | Entries you did not add |
| LaunchAgents folders | Unfamiliar items in /Library/LaunchAgents and ~/Library/LaunchAgents |
| /Library/LaunchDaemons | A system-wide background job you did not install |
.git/hooks in your projects | A pre-commit hook you did not write |
| Mac updates | Automatic configuration updates or Rapid Security Response switched off |
Read your .zshrc and each pre-commit hook as plain text. A line you cannot explain is a reason to dig, not a conclusion. If you find one, stop signing in to important accounts from this Mac and start the steps below from a clean computer. The infostealer check page has the general order of steps.
08If you built an infected project
Treat what the Mac could reach as copied, the way you would after any stealer. Replace credentials and sessions from a trusted system, not from the Mac itself. Change the passwords stored on the affected Mac and turn on two-step sign-in. If signs of persistence remain, consider a full clean reinstall of macOS and do not reuse backups or Time Machine images that may be tainted. The full order is in the infostealer check.
Because XCSSET goes after wallet data and swaps copied addresses, double-check every wallet address before you send funds. Keep secrets in a vault, not in .env files, and use short-lived credentials so the next replacement is smaller.
If you ship apps, tell the people who own your signing keys and release accounts, because signing keys are among the secrets developer-targeted campaigns take. Replace those keys from the clean computer too, and review the build settings of the suspect project before the next release.
09Other ways a project can run code
XCSSET uses the build step. A campaign called TasksJacker used the moment you open the folder instead, planting tasks in more than 400 GitHub repositories. In a workspace you have trusted, a task set to run when the folder opens starts by itself. More on that is in malicious VS Code extensions, malware in GitHub repositories and fake job interview malware, where fake recruiters tell you to clone and run a project. The family list, including AMOS, is on the Mac stealer table, and Atomic Stealer covers AMOS in detail.
Artificial Immunity's free, open-source core watches program starts, git hooks and VS Code tasks on your Mac and reports what it finds.
FAQ
What is XCSSET malware?
XCSSET is modular macOS malware known for infecting Xcode projects and running while a project is built. It has operated in the wild since 2020 and its authors are unknown.
Is Xcode malware a risk if I only open a project?
The reports describe it running while the project is built, so the build is the moment to take care. Check where a project came from before that step.
What does XCSSET steal?
Files, system and user information, digital wallet data and notes. A September 2025 variant adds clipboard hijacking and Firefox targeting.
Where does XCSSET hide on a Mac?
It can persist through the .zshrc file and a fake Launchpad in the Dock. A later variant adds a LaunchDaemon, and it can also use pre-commit hooks in a project's .git directory.
Can XCSSET change the apps I build?
It can change Xcode build settings and compromise final app binaries without disrupting development workflows. A project you suspect is worth reviewing before you ship a build from it.
What should I do if I built an infected project?
Replace credentials and sessions from a trusted system, and change passwords stored on the affected Mac. Do not reuse backups that may be tainted.
Related guides
Sources
- Microsoft Security, new XCSSET variant, March 2025
- Microsoft Security, XCSSET evolves again, September 2025
- Moonlock, XCSSET and app development
- Microsoft Security, Contagious Interview
- OpenSourceMalware, TasksJacker
- Microsoft, Hunting infostealers on macOS
- VS Code docs, tasks
- Apple Support, Login Items
- Apple Support, launchd script management
- Artificial Immunity